Youth constitute the largest percentage of the total world population and are considered core to the development of society. However, even with the large numbers, researches on youth in Africa tend to be skewed on employment and labour distribution, education and human development. Outside these formalized sectors, youth are studied as the most controversial group based on their behavior and seemingly misplaced roles. The place of youth in conflict in Africa is thus unexplored as available research focuses more on child soldiers in relation to recruitment, effects of conflicts, disarmament and reintegration. Beyond this, youth in conflict are studied in relation to violence and delinquency particularly in the United States of America and Europe and hardly in Africa. This is despite the growing involvement of youths in conflict as militias, rebels, vigilante groups as well as victims. This article explores the place of youths in conflict of post-colonial Africa where their role has increasingly grown. As a comparative analysis, it uses the case study of Al-shabaab in Somalia and Mungiki in Kenya
Introduction
During the early years of independence in the 1960s and 1970s, youth or young people in Africa were not seen a serious challenges to the development of the newly independent states. Thus, unemployed, uneducated and idle youth were not a major target for governments, international community as well as for local and international funding institutions (Mkandawire, implies that the term youth is socially and culturally constructed. This gives rise to a number of conceptions of the term youth which include political, cultural/traditional, aesthetic, artistic, biological, and legal.
A cultural/traditional youth is one who is defined in accordance to traditional practices that mark the transition from one stage of life to another through the process of rite of passage. These traditional practices involve initiation practices such as removal of certain organs of the body, teeth or put certain marks on the body. One of the most common initiation practices common among African communities is circumcision that is carried out by among others the Maasai, Gikuyu, Abaluhyia, and Kalenjins of Kenya. In this regard, human development is seen to involve three stages in life that is; childhood, puberty and adulthood. These stages not only mark changes in the human body but are also mark stages at which new responsibilities are acquired such as marriage.
However, with the influence of modernity, there exist the so-called cultural youth who despite having gone through the initiation have not fulfilled their cultural responsibilities. Hence, even at the age of 40s they are still being referred to as youth. While some of them, it is a matter of choice to others it is a result of the need to pursue certain goals in life such as education and career.
For African communities, failing to fulfill the traditionally defined norms is unaccepted and subsequently these groups of youth are collectively classified as defiant youth. The current 159 President of Botswana is a good example of a defiant youth. Nonetheless his current position in Botswana as the head of state and the chief of Bamagwato people has forced him to try and fulfill the Bamagwato"s ethnic tradition that defines marriage as an obligation for anyone assuming traditional duties (ABC News, 2010) . This denotes that while cultural/traditional youth may abscond and ignore traditional practices, circumstances do force them to adhere to cultural standards.
A legal youth is the most common definition used across the world. A legal youth refers to any social group that falls between specified age brackets. According to the United Nation Convention on Child rights a youth is defined as "young persons (boy/girl) of ages between eighteen and thirty five years (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (UN, 1996) . The third conception of a youth is derived from politics and the political history of a country. This is a political youth. The second group, emphasis the length of time one has served in the government.
Consequently, those who served longest and in this case both in Kenyatta"s and Moi"s government are categorized as the old generation while those who served the shortest period of time or never served are classified as the youth. The third view identifies with people of 30 years and below in relation to the incumbent leadership. If during 30 years of their life these youth have not known any other leaders than the incumbent, then, it goes without saying that the incumbent is a representation of old generation. In cases of political protests and revolutions, the incumbent become the bad as evidenced in Libya with Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt with Hosni Mubarak.
While the idolized leaders of these protests and revolutions are not young Turks that is El-Baradei, 160 68 years and Sahel in Egypt and Libya respectively. The mere fact that those aged 30 years and below have never been lead by them earns them the title of a youth.
This group is however not without contradictions particularly when the political climate appears to discredit or question them. A common practice with political youth in Kenya is when guarantee to win a political office is dictated by the association of political youth with the older generation. Where this applies as it sometimes, the political youth then considers the older politicians as being politically correct therefore becoming bed-fellows. Contrastingly, when questioned about their illogical political outbursts, poor leadership and failure to deliver on their campaign promises by the legal youth, they blame the old generation. When the question of giving legal youth opportunity to lead, the political youth are quick to switch to cultural cards of equating grey hair with wisdom and thus the legal youths are leaders of tomorrow. The irony of this political gimmick is that the cultural niche of age that political youth fall back to literally disqualifies them when compared to the older generation.
Remaining youthful and being a youth is equated to people in the "process of becoming rather than being". This state of becoming makes people desire to be in it for as long. However, as people age the body tissues loses water causing human skin to lose the youthful and subsequent physical features of a youth. Beyond this, the depletion of ozone layer and climate change resulting from increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere causes skin to age faster than normal (Urbach, 1991) . Because of this, scientists, dermatologist and cosmetologists have come up with means of ensuring that though the body ages one can still pride himself or herself of being a youth.
The solutions given by the scientists, dermatologists and cosmetologists have lead to the rise of a new conception of a youth that is aesthetic. This category cuts across all the divides of conceptions of youth that is biological or calendar, legal, cultural, and political.
Some of the most common methods of changing a sagging and aging skin include plastic surgery, bleaching of skin, cosmetic surgery, cosmetics, exercise and botox. Examples of aesthetic youth includes; Oprah Winfrey, the late Michael Jackson, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Madonna, President Obama, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Hilary Clinton and Angelina Jolie among others. For 161 the legal youth, the aesthetic youth are perceived as good role models. This has caused some legal youth to ape the lifestyle of aesthetic youth.
Beyond these conceptions, identifying with youth culture is becoming a common trend to be classified as a youth. In Kenya for instance, speaking the slang language, Sheng (a mixture of Kiswahili and English language with variants from other local or international dialects) that is common among the youth determines whether one is a youth or an old buddy. Another means of being identified as a youth. For example Yoweri Museveni of Uganda who is past the age of a youth legally and culturally has in the recent past associated himself with the youth culture. In 2010 Museveni used youth culture in this case rap music to attract the support of the youth in his political campaign (Njoroge, 2010) . His title of a youth was however short-lived as after elections the "rapping president" recoiled into his political title. In Kenya, the issue of young or youthful leaders is an endless discussion. Currently, one of the Member of Parliament for Makadara constituency Mike Sonko has been in the forefront for accusing the rest of the Members of Parliament who in his view have failed to deliver in parliament because of their age and lack of alertness. In his view, he is in parliament to awaken the "sleeping legislative members" and the best way is to dress youthful besides his youthfulness (Shiundu, 2011) . Hence, to him the issue is not having young people in parliament, but dressing youthful. This raises concern for Kenya as it related to youth leadership and their credibility as representative of their people.
Overview of youth in armed conflict
In Africa, the images of youth as the most vulnerable and innocent social category have dominated mainstream sectors. Therefore, youth involvement in armed conflict becomes quiet alarming and causes great concern. This is because, vulnerability and innocence is seen as resulting from being the protected, lack of resources and power of influence. In such an environment the participation of youth in armed conflict and violence is understood in relation to achievement of adult dreams be it the political, economical, religious or cultural. The youth are therefore a tool or a resource for adults. There is no where the idea of youth as tools for achieving goals is more relevant that in politics where access to social, political and economic goodies is dependent on politics of manipulation and patronage (Oloo, 2010) . When politics of manipulation 162 and patronage are played out in conflict situations, the youth are reduced to passive actors, solely dependent on others. This may not be the case in conflict and violent situation where youth have been active participants (UNDP and GoK, 2007) . Moreover, defining the youth as tools for political gain obscures the direct involvement of youth in conflict and violence as independent actors. This notion further help in upholding conventional studies that limits the role of youth in conflict to child soldiers and an unruly social group.
Upholding these conventional views in Africa where over 70 conflicts have taken place since 1970s is wanting. This is because despite the limitation of data, youth have been active participants in conflict and violence as witnessed in Kenya, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Malawi, South Africa, Somalia and Liberia. And although conflicts are natural to every society, the increased and adverse effects of conflicts with youth as active participants is exasperating (Mwagiru, 2005) .
Added to the involvement of the youth in African conflicts are the increased and multiplicity of actors in a single and multiple conflicts. Examples of actors include the state and its mercenaries, militias, rebels, vigilantes, criminal bands, ethnic and religious armed wings, private security companies among others. These actors are what collectively refer to as armed non-state groups (ANSGs) who have been "key players in the political violence that have severely undermined human security in Africa . In all these groups, youth who constitute the largest percentage of the total national populations in most countries tend to dominate the membership and related activities.
In the context of social, political and economic challenges that tend to overshadow African states, the place of the youth has become a fundamental paradox. On one hand they are viewed as both makers and breakers of society while they are simultaneously being made and broken by the society (De Boeck and Honwana, 2005) . Youth are thus two sides of the same coin. As makers of the society, they are studied alongside children as a heterogeneous group that contributes to the societal structures, norms, rituals and directions while they are being shaped by them (Biaya, 2000) . As makers of the society, they also make themselves through inventive "forms of selfrealization and an ingenious politics of identity (De Boeck, 1999) . Politically, they make the society by acting as a political force, a source of resistance and resilience.
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The youth also act as breakers because of the risk factors that they engaged in. Some of these risks include drug use, alcohol, truancy, violence and unsafe sex. At the same time, by breaking expected societal norms, practices, rules and conventions they end up killing people, dehumanizing and harming others by their violent activities. Breaking also implies dismantling the chains of oppression as witnessed in South Africa where young people played a crucial role in "breaking" the apartheid system. Currently, this breaking role is what Munene (2011) sees as being played out in the ongoing Arab revolutions. For Munene, the participation of the youth in the protest shows the role of the youth in "breaking from an increasingly untenable existing condition" (Munene, 2011: 1) . Additionally, they are also breaking the society as the same youth are "turning against their parents and grandparents".
In all, the youth are constantly shaping and shaking the society as they are also being shaped and shaken by the very society. In this process of being shaped and shaken the youth are pushed, coerced into different actions by existing structures and process some of which they have little or no control. Some of this includes the family, community, media, technology, state, conflict and war situations, religion, and global systems. Key to all these aspects is that the youth are constantly being broken down by exclusion, wars, unemployment, poverty, marginalization, and lack of access to education, denial of adulthood status among others (Dawes and Honwana, 1996) .
Collectively, these features of the youths of breaking, making, being made and being broken causes the youth, children and young people to be lumped together as a single heterogeneous group. This makes it difficult to grasp and pin down analytically the youth in armed conflict.
Other than the definition that is highly contested and categorically undefined, scholars and researchers have made frantic effort to explain why youth engage in armed conflict and violence in Africa. There are a number of factors contributing to the involvement of youth in armed conflict and violence. Firstly is the youth culture particularly the problem of unemployment, underemployment and the disaffection youth. This culture as noted by Comaroff and Comaroff (2005) depicts youth as undesirable and a social status that one tries to escape of which, one of the best ways is to engage in violence and armed conflict. Secondly, youth engage in violence and armed conflict because of the proliferation of small arms and illicit weapons. Still related to the 164 proliferation of arms is the notion that access to small arms appears to have an empowering effect on alienated youth such as the marginalized, street children and the unemployed. Hence fighting as independent groups or alongside rebels, militias or government troops using AK-47 enlist a deeper means of empowerment than the youth culture and street life.
For youths who lack training, formal education and specialized skills involving oneself in armed conflict and violence become an easy way to earn a livelihood. The reason being war and violence offers an option that requires little or no skills neither capital investment while at the same time it provides quick returns. Hence, for frustrated youths both male and female, the gun gives them an informal way of controlling resources and gives them command with regard to money and power. Another reason related to existence of violent situations in a country. Long term conflict like those witnesses in Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone affected generations causing people to live in protracted situations. Besides, the political, economic and social structures were destroyed. And with no other life known to the youths and with no incentives to deter them from engaging in violence, joining the warring groups is not a loss for the youth. That is why Chigunta (2002) argues that the youth have no personal properties or dependable employment thus they have the "lowest opportunity cost in war"
According to a 2007 report by UNDP and the Government of Kenya, youth engage in armed conflict and violence if subjected to social and economic marginalization, unstable governments, poverty, insecurity, and development challenges. The widespread of drugs such as heroine and marijuana among others on war front and in urban areas also play a key role in enticing youth into armed conflict. The use of these drugs by youth in armed conflict erodes "selfcontrol, enhance free-will behavior and encourage acts of bravery". Chigunta (2002) further argues that the issue is not whether such youth have used drugs before but "the quality and intensity of use which increases considerably in war fronts " (2002: 19) . Youth can also engage in violence and armed conflict in order to challenge the traditional political elite for control of the state. This has been the case in recent Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions.
According to Engels (2010) youth engage in armed conflict and violence because they are less threatened by physical death than social death. Social death stem from material conditions of life that is closely linked to class based social inequalities that induce the gap between the youth and elderly. To escape social death, youth migrate to other countries, initiate or join an armed group as a way of finding a balancing act between social death and violent life.
Other factors explaining the participation of youth in armed conflict are: cultural practices such as cattle rustling among the pastoral communities in Kenya, collapse of the traditional family coping structures leaving a social void, for street children the tough life in streets develop in them qualities that makes them prey for rebels, vigilante groups and militias. Moreover, as a people lacking families to belong to, belonging to the fighting groups gives them a sense of belonging.
Understanding the Al-shabaab
Somalia is located in the eastern corner of Africa, known as the Horn of Africa. It is one of the African countries that have experienced the longest history of conflict in which youth have been active participants. The violent history in Somalia represents a deep contrast of the exceptional state that was romanticized at independence. The romanticization of an exceptional state was re-affirmed by Ali Mazrui in 1986 when he argued that while most African state were diverse and in search of national identity, Somalis were a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification. This was because of their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic homogeneity. An assumption of homogeneity state of Somalia was that Somalis being one people, differences would be easily solved however from the Somalia there were other issues cleave to hence making the common to different. The issues of cleavage are pointed out by Ahmed (2006) Qaeda" (Shinn, 2010; 206) . Others include backing of proxy states by the Euro-powers, foreign recruitment by Al-shabaab and support of Al-shabaab by Eritrea. Thus, Al-shabaab youth are a force to reckon with due to their global linkages, history of growth in armed conflict and their youthfulness.
Understanding the mungiki
Unlike Somalia, Kenya has been a relatively peaceful country despite the inter-tribal conflicts that have been a common feature of Kenya"s post-independence history. In Kenya"s conflict history the youth have featured differently. For example, during the struggle for independence the youth participated actively through the Mau Mau movement (Oloo, 2010) . Mau
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Mau leaders such as Dedan Kimathi and General China were said to have been below 35 years when they returned from the forest 2 . Youth participation in politics was however short-lived as after independence, the national multi-ethnic alliance disintegrated leading to rise of patrimonial politics that transformed the youth identity into weapons of the elders (Kagwanja, 2005 : Lonsdale, 1986 ). And as their participation in politics and economy dwindled they were pushed into the periphery. This resulted into formation of youth wingers that were core to KANU politics which change later with the re-introduction of multi-party system. During this time, the youth were mobilized to form tribal militias which were used to wage war against the opposition who in return formed their own militias (Oloo, 2010; 43) . In the aftermath of 1997 election, the Mungiki youth under the leadership of Ndura Waruinge and Maina Njenga migrated to urban center since violence had ceased. In Nairobi, the Mungiki found the leader of the Tent of the Living God, Ngonya wa Gakonyo whose religion called for the revival of the Agikuyu traditional religion. The Mungiki found religious refuge in Ngonya wa Gakonyo"s religious beliefs in keeping with the religious belief of the original Mungiki. As a result the transformed military youth lead by Ndura Waruinge was co-opted into the sect. In urban centers and especially in Nairobi the Mungiki was depicted as a criminal gang due to its fearlessness and military history that defined the group in Rift Valley.
As the group expanded, the fearlessness of Mungiki when faced with danger was "stolen" by idle, unemployed and criminal youth in Nairobi who saw the name Mungiki as a means of accessing economic power. The transformed group began to use threats to extort money from matatus, businessmen and protection fees from the poor people. For these group of youth, the name "Mungiki" spoke for them. Politically, the group was used by the politicians who saw Mungiki as means of achieving their political agenda (Oloo, 2010) . Mungiki are also seen to have 
A comparative analysis of the mungiki and al-shabaab youths in armed conflict
There are a number of similarities and difference between Mungiki and Al-shabaab, which to some extent demonstrate the difference in impact that their activities have. Similarly, the participation of youth in armed conflict and violence through Al-shabaab and Mungiki tends to concur with De Boeck (2000) proposition that youth are in indeed the breakers of themselves, the societal norms and the society as a whole.
To start with, both the militia groups rely on voluntary and forceful recruitment through coercion or by instilling fear. Their main targets are youth of school going age between 9 and 20 years. Al-shabaab as reported by a human right group forceful recruit young people to fight their wars while others are enticed using money, mobile phones and promise of salvation from Allah if they die fighting for Islam (Human Rights Watch, 2011) . This aspect of forceful recruitment also dominates the Mungiki where those identify as possible members are often threatened to join the group while others are first befriended before being assimilated into the group. This forceful recruit implies that it is impossible to tell how many fighters believe in the ideologies of these groups. To ensure allegiance both groups have development mechanism of ensuring members remain loyal. The Al-shabaab forces their recruits to swear in the name of Allah to fight for their country. Mungiki uses oaths as means of introducing norms that have to be followed by members failure to which one is condemned to death. Hence, the purpose of oath in Mungiki is norminal.
Generally, youth constitute both male and female groups; however the membership of Mungiki and Al-shabaab is dominated by Ushababi 6 that is young men. While media occasionally highlight women old and young, as members of these groups and particularly Mungiki, their role is not well known. What is however known about both groups are brutality and inhuman atrocities committed by the ushababi of Mungiki and Al-shabaab against women. For instance Al-shabaab is known for arresting, detaining and publicly flogging women caught in adultery (Human Rights Watch, 2010) . Some of the Al-shabaab norms for women include wearing abaya, a Somali traditional dress that covers the whole body except face, hands and feet. The abaya is a very expensive dress and for rural women, it is an impossible dress to have yet one cannot leave the house without it. As a result, women are forced to share the dress and thus they can only leave the homes at a time. Other norms include barring women from engaging in activities that would lead them to mix with men including small-scale commercial activities as well as failing to pray at prescribed times. On its part, Mungiki which claims to be defending African tradition of the Agikuyu stripped women in public for wearing trousers which they consider to be contrary to traditional practices of the Agikuyu (Daily Nation, 2000) . Mungiki has also been accused of raping women and committing other atrocities such as murder. Such behavior from the youth are not only an abrogation of the rights of women but a reflection of patriarchy interpretation of human rights, hence women rights are rights as defined by their male counterparts. relatives. This is despite the heinous acts that could otherwise be described as crimes against humanity.
In their group psychology, both groups believe that by belonging and committing the atrocities they are eliminating their defined social, political or cultural evils from the larger society.
For instance, the Al-shabaab believe by chopping off hands of people caught stealing or stoning women found committing adultery or by banning soccer and watching TV they are leading off their society of social misfits who are threat to Islam. Similar cases are reported of Mungiki when they strip women, who are caught wearing trousers or what they consider as men clothing unfit to worn by women. Unfortunately, their actions do not eliminate the perceived threat instead they break the social harmony as the people they continuously terrorize are their own kinsmen, friends and citizens of their own country, hence breaking the society further.
According to Huysmans (1998) The war between the TFG and the Al-shabaab militant group has thus endangered the lives of Somalis and denied them a favorable environment for economic and social development. The Alshabaab is not only a threat to Somalia and its people it is also a threat to regional peace. In 2010 and 2011, Uganda and Kenya respectively were attacked by the militant group. Other than being a threat to peace and security, Al-shabaab attacks further complicates the diplomatic relationships between Somalia and its neighbors.
Despite lacking a regional reach Mungiki has effected dangerous violent actions using cheap crude weapons. These activities were carried out in the name of revenging against government crack down, defectors, and the disobedient. The group has also continued to terrorize citizens through extortion of the so-called "operation taxes". These are taxes that one is supposed to pay to in order to construct a house, farm privately owned land, operate a matatu in certain routes as well as run a business. In this case, Mungiki operate as an informal government. By their violent and extortionist activities the Mungiki members makes it difficult for people to develop themselves economically, thus threatening their livelihood. By targeting those who denounce or betray the group, Mungiki makes it more difficult to heal broken families as well as the communities in the affected areas.
Both groups are also threat to peace process and reconciliation. This is through their discriminative interpretation of social activities that are considered key to conflict transformation and promotion of peace (Ahmed and Macharia, unpublished) . Some of these activities/events include sports, music festivals, education and entertainment among others. Such activities like playing or watching soccer and watching television in public are banned by Al-shabaab militant group (Raghavan, 2010) . During the eve of the Africa"s most enthusiastic event, the World Cup, the Al-shabab member prohibited broadcasting of World Cup describing the sport as a "satanic act" that corrupts Muslims. The group also killed and arrested people found watching the World Cup matches. National and local soccer was also a target of the group, as owners of local clubs were As part of their historical background, youth in Africa are part and parcel of a society and more so an ethnic group. The importance of an ethnic group cannot be underestimated as it provides avenues where identities are constructed and reconstructed especially when youth seek a rationale for getting involved in conflicts. This is because in it, the interests of the ethnic group being protected are found, ethnic kingpins support or/and a solace group to fall-back to for support.
While the youth may not incorporate all cultural aspects of their ethnic group in their violent activities, they may however choose selected customs and beliefs that appear rational. For instance, Mungiki ascribe to Agikuyu cultural beliefs including consumption of the tobacco snuff, praying facing Mount Kenya and gender roles (Kagwanja, 2003) .
Al-shabaab on the other hand does not seem to ascribe to any ethnic group other than the Islamic religion and a political religious ideology. This is despite the fact that the Al-shabaab members, judging from appearance and the language they speak, belong to an ethnic group called Somali. The Somali ethnic group is dominant in the Horn of Africa and in some parts of Kenya.
Essentially, by failing to ascribe to their ethnic group, the Al-shabaab appears to be concurring with Munene"s (2010) This construction of identity around religion rather than ethnic group has made it possible for the Al-shabaab to find allies among non-state armed groups with whom they share their ideologies. One such group is the Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda, an international recognized terrorist group said to be based in Afghanistan has a network across the globe (Shinn, 2010) . Al-Qaeda is also on the US State Department list of terrorist organizations (Somaiya, 2010) . Beyond the religious ideologies especially implementation of Sharia, the Al-shabaab overtly declared its affiliation with Al-Qaeda in 2007 causing an alarm regionally and in the global frontiers (Somaiya, 2010; Harnich, 2010) . This declaration had serious implication for the Euro-powers as they saw
Al-shabaab as a serious threat to their national security and therefore global peace and security.
Besides the declaration, Al-shabaab is known to have had close links with Al-Qaeda"s top leadership and its activities around the world (Shinn D, 2011 i ). In the context of global security and particularly in post-9/11 the reaction by the Euro-powers that is North America and Western
European countries (Munene, 2011) to non state armed groups has sinister motives and is driven by self-interest rather than the need promote stability and rebuild countries ravaged by wars. The laxity of international community to see the internal danger posed by Mungiki to the national stability in Kenya can be seen in their lack of commit to support the government in fighting the militants. While Mungiki is not the only vigilante group in Kenya it is said to have the highest number of youth membership (Kagwanja, 2005) . Instead the international community uses
Mungiki to depict Kenya as a failed state and discredit the government of Kenya. For instance, while post-election involved criminal gangs it is unrealistic to claim that much of the violence was "initiated by ethnically centered gangs particularly Mungiki (Majekodunmi B, 2010) . The singling out of one group by the international community is an indication of self-interest of the international community in small states. For the big issue here is beyond Kenya as a failed state but having a generation of young people breaking their lives and that of the society.
Conclusion
Despite efforts made by the TFG of Somalia and international community in the case of Somalia and the Kenyan government, the militant youth groups still remain active. For the Kenyan government, the coalition wrangles have overshadowed serious security issues such as dealing with vigilante groups. Although the Police Commissioner, Matthew Iteere has issued warning against the groups they continue with their activities though silence. One wonders where this is a reflection of a continuation of previous policies that treat youth as a periphery political actor or a weakness of the state. According to Oloo (2010) it is an indication of culture of impunity that has been engrained in Kenya"s political socio-economic set up.
The state response to the militant groups, Mungiki and Al-shabaab has not been sufficient to deal with the groups. For Al-shabaab military action will continue to fail because the issues in Somalia are not just political but have also had to do with social organization in which clans and sub-clans are defining elements. Engaging all actors in peace process must therefore consider religious and contemporary leaders as well as hidden structures such as warlord and extremist religious group and mafia style business. The hidden structures are crucial because they have maintained exclusive ownership in all discussion for the fate of Somalia. Even when these groups control the process, the youth are retained as the ground troops but not the office negotiators. Hence, this creates opportunities for the reproduction of conflict and as generations of young people remain in the periphery they are key pointer to the reproduction of conflict agenda therefore engraining a culture of violence.
Evidence has shown that the continued existence of Mungiki and Al-shabaab is to some extent a result of the marginalization of the youth economically and politically. Failure to therefore address the foundation issues will maintain the groups as tools for the elite and politicians on one hand. It also makes the youth group perpetrate violence as political periphery groups and as criminal groups on the other hand. Therefore, crack down on group should trace their connection.
The key basic tenets of International Humanitarian Law and human rights have also been ignored by Mungiki and Al-shabaab. The attacks which are affected in the name of protecting their members and their interests appear to contradict the essence of human right. In the eyes of the two groups, the mere fact that one is a human being does not guarantee protection. Instead it is ones allegiance, obedience and prescription to defined norms, values and beliefs. In addition, attack on families and relatives are a clear reflection of lack of respect for the elders. This shows that both groups need to be dealt with using both retributive and restorative legal mechanisms in order to ensure justice and healing for the affected the societies.
Moreover to achieve the UNESCO agenda for a culture of peace, education should be dialogical rather than one-way engagement. For the militia group who are outside the education system, opportunities to learn should be provided through non-formal education where community members come together to deconstruct existing conflict attitudes, beliefs and systems that perpetuate violence as a means for survival for the youth. Conflict transformation should also focus on promoting the peace, maintaining law and order, rather than the generic peace (Munene, 2009 ). While defining this balance is a challenge for Kenya and Somalia in the midst of globalist agenda, restoring social cohesion in the communities should be the driving force.
